The difference between “knowledge” and “belief” is nothing more than in the degree of certainty. With regard to things which make not a very deep impression on the memory, it may be called “belief.” “Knowledge” is nothing more than a man’s firm belief. The difference is ordinarily merely in the degree, to be judged of by the court, when addressed co the court; by the jury, when addressed to the jury. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. See Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 55 S. W. 1091, 49 L. R. A. 323, 78 Am. St. Rep. 509; Ohio Valley Coffin Co. v. Goble, 28 Ind. App. 362, 62 N. EL 1025; Clarke v. Ingram, 107 Ga. 565, 33 S. E. 802.
Knowledge may be classified in a legal sense, as positive and imputed, imputed, when the means of knowledge exists, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and technically understood, becomes immaterial. It is only material when, in the absence of knowledge, it produces the same results. However closely actual notice may, in many instances, approximate knowledge, and constructive notice may be its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge; and, when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge, and be sufficient. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert. 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773. Carnal knowledge. Coitus; copulation; sexual intercourse. Personal knowledge. Knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which is original, and does not depend on information or hearsay. Personal knowledge of an allegation in an answer is personal knowledge of its truth or falsity; and if the allegation is a negative one, this necessarily includes a knowledge of the truth or falsity of the allegation denied. West v. Home Ins. Co. (C. C.) 18 Fed. 622.