In pleading. Indirect; inferential. Steph. PI. 179. A pleading is so called in which the statement on which the pleader relies Is implied instead of being expressed, or where it contains, in addition to proper statements of facts, reasoning or arguments upon those facts and their relation to the matter in dispute, such as should be reserved for presentation at the trial. Argumentum a commnniter acciden tilras in jure frequens est. An argument drawn from things commonly happening Is frequent in law. Broom, Max. 44. mum in jure. An argument from division [of the subject] is of the greatest force in law. Co. Litt 2136; 6 Coke, 60. argument from the greater to the less Is of no force negatively; affirmatively it is. Jenk. Cent 281. Argnmentnm a simili valet in lege. An argument from a like case (from analogy) is good in law. Co. Litt. 191. Argnmentnm ab anctoritate est for tissimnm in lege. An argument from authority is the strongest in the law. “The book cases are the best proof of what the law is.” Co. Litt 254a. Argnmentnm ab impossibili valet in lege. An argument drawn from an impossibility is forcible in law. Co. Litt. 92a. Argnmentnm ab inconvenient! est validnm in lege; qnia lex non permit tit aliquod inconveniens. An argument drawn from what is inconvenient is good in law, because the law will not permit any inconvenience. Co. Litt. 66a, 258. Argnmentnm ab inconvenient! pluri mnm valet [est validnm] in lege. An argument drawn from inconvenience is of the greatest weight [is forcible] in law. Co. Litt. 66a, 97a, 1526, 2586; Broom, Max. 184. If there be in any deed or instrument equivocal expressions, and great inconvenience must necessarily follow from one construction, it is strong to show that such construction is not according to the true intention of the grantor; but where there is no equivocal expression in the instrument, and the words used admit only of one meaning, arguments of inconvenience prove only want of foresight in the grantor. 3 Madd. 540; 7 Taunt. 496.